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Abstract Blockchain technology is often proposed as an
infrastructure for decentralized Know-Your-Customer
(KYC) verification, i.e., a process determining whether a
customer is eligible for a given transaction. The benefit of
using blockchain technology lies in the expected compliance costs reduction for companies by automatically
enforcing KYC-requirements, whose results are accessible
by multiple financial institutions. While information systems researchers have proposed conceptual models and
prototypes of blockchain-based KYC-systems, they do not
yet consider severe penalties that are applicable to companies if KYC-requirements are not met. Hence, if the legal
requirements for KYC-processes cannot be met, these
systems are not applicable. The paper uses an objectivecentered design science research approach to develop a
blockchain-based KYC-system for the conduct of ICOs
that is compliant-by-design. To this end, the authors first
identify existing KYC-requirements and define corresponding system design objectives that are used to develop
a KYC-system that automatically enforces KYC-regulations, thereby preventing money laundering and other
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forms of identity fraud. Second, the authors contribute to
the literature by providing a blueprint for compliant-bydesign blockchain-based KYC-systems, in the paper, integrated into the investment flow of an ICO. Third, the
authors propose a KYC-system that is applicable in the real
world, by making – due to legal certainty – KYC-processes
cost-effective, i.e., the proposed blockchain-based KYCsystem expectably reduces compliance costs for customers
and financial organizations.
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1 Introduction
Initial coin offerings (ICOs) constitute a novel mechanism,
typically used for the funding of highly innovative ventures
that issue and sell virtual tokens to a crowd of investors
(Fisch 2019). While ICOs share similarities with conventional crowdfunding, the differentiating feature is the use of
blockchain technology, providing a decentralized database
and a distributed software architecture that enables the
direct exchange of money against tokens without the need
of financial intermediation (Notheisen et al. 2017). Given
the disruptive potential brought along by the blockchainbased funding mechanism, ICOs attracted a massive influx
of investments summing up to US $7,8 billion in 2018
alone (ICOData 2019). To put this into context, the world’s
largest reward-based crowdfunding platform, Kickstarter,
raised about US $3.4 billion from inception through to
April 2018 (Adhami et al. 2018).
While peer-to-peer crowdfunding steers investment, the
capability to conduct pseudonymous transfers through non-
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face-to-face relationships (FATF 2018) attracts the attention of legal authorities (Fridgen et al. 2018; Arnold et al.
2019). In particular, its virtuality and the variety of possible
token designs give authorities a hard time enforcing tax and
bank laws (Arnold et al. 2019), thereby considerably
increasing the risk for large-scale money laundering
schemes and terrorist funding (European Union 2018;
FATF 2018). European legislators reacted to this situation
by updating the European Anti-Money-Laundering (AML)
regulations, amending the current legal framework to
specifically address money laundering risks of ICOs
(Haffke et al. 2019). Coming into force in 2020, EU-based
companies wanting to raise funds via ICOs need now to
ensure customer due-diligence measures by implementing
appropriate Know-Your-Customer (KYC) processes (Haffke et al. 2019).
Given these developments, this paper is dedicated to
identify KYC-requirements in order to develop a compliant-by-design, blockchain-based KYC-system integrated
into the investment flow of an ICO. Compliant-by-design
means that we use regulations as input to design a system
that automatically enforces KYC-requirements or otherwise terminates the ICO investment process (Lohmann
2013). From a technical point of view, designing a blockchain-based KYC-system for ICOs is straightforward given
a common technological backbone; however, we first need
to identify requirements for ICOs that affect the KYCsystem design, which automatically enforces requirements.
Thus, we ask ourselves: What are the design requirements
for a blockchain-based joint KYC/ICO-system, and how
can we meet these requirements in our prototype design?
To answer this research question, we apply an objectivecentered design science research (DSR) approach to identify KYC-requirements for ICOs based on EU-AML regulations as well as German federal regulations (Peffers
et al. 2008). We use Germany as one example of an EU
member state in which an ICO is conducted and, thus, is
subject to federal regulations. By working on the intersection of IS, legal, and computer science research, we
contribute to the latest state of research, in which blockchain-based KYC-systems have been suggested but not
designed or tested for legal compliance. Consequently, our
research attempt is in line with recent recommendations of
Hinz et al. (2019), emphasizing that IS researchers need to
take care of policy-related topics to ensure the applicability
of scientific IT artifacts.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows:
Sect. 2 provides an overview of related work. We then
describe our research method and proceed to describe legal
requirements and design objectives in Sects. 3 and 4.
Section 5 presents the higher-level architecture of the
developed prototype as well as implementation details for
demonstration purposes. Subsequently, the technical
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feasibility, legal compliance, and applicability of the KYCsystem are discussed in Sect. 6. Eventually, a conclusion is
provided in Sect. 7.

2 Related Work
Blockchain technology is frequently proposed to serve as
regulatory technology (Gozman et al. 2019), where a formal contract and programming language is used as a tool to
enforce regulations automatically (Egelund-Müller et al.
2017; Parra Moyano and Ross 2017). Thereby, processes
can be created in such a way that they are compliant-bydesign, i.e., regulations are taken as input for process
model design so that they automatically enforce the
respective rules (Lohmann 2013). The compliance-by-design approach makes subsequent proofs and potential correction of processes unnecessary while ensuring flexibility,
i.e., the ability to implement and modify system requirements (Lohmann 2013), which is necessary when considering a field subject to rapid technical and legal
developments.
Before we consider KYC-regulations, however, we will
seek to provide an overview of already proposed solutions
for blockchain-based and, potentially, compliant-by-design
KYC-systems on which the intended prototype can probably build. In particular, following vom Brocke et al.
(2020), we understand DSR as a method that deliberately
builds on and demonstrates how previous design knowledge can be consumed to produce new design knowledge
that contributes to existing knowledge within and across
research projects.
We, therefore, screened the AIS eLibrary using the
keywords (blockchain* OR ‘‘distributed ledger*’’ AND
‘‘know your customer’’ OR KYC*), searching for peerreviewed articles between 2008 and 2020. This search
delivered 40 articles, which were first screened for exclusion criteria (i.e., panel setups, workshops, proposal or
research-in-progress, abstract-only) and for whether the
articles were actually concerned with KYC-processes.
Based on the initial screening, 28 articles remained which
determine the KYC-process as a prerequisite for the
acceptance and use of ICOs. We commenced with a second
round of screening, identifying articles that develop or
propose conceptual models, proof-of-works, or prototypes
of blockchain-based KYC-systems, excluding papers that
only mention the importance of KYC-processes. Notably,
this left us with a single article, i.e., Parra Moyano and
Ross (2017), who introduce a prototype for a blockchainbased, optimized KYC-system for financial organizations.
Given the scarcity of IS research related to blockchainbased KYC-processes in the AIS eLibrary, we extended the
literature search to the computer science and engineering
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research domain, applying the same keywords to the IEEE
Xplore database. While the AIS eLibrary is one of the most
relevant databases and a knowledge base for the IS
research domain, we chose to query the IEEE Xplore
database to include more technical sources, helping us to
identify the foundations on which we can build the envisaged prototype.
This search resulted in 10 articles, 3 of which focus on
the design and development of blockchain-based KYCsystems. For instance, Bhaskaran et al. (2018) discuss a
shared KYC-process for financial institutions based on
blockchain technology, focusing on the implementation of
a proposed double-blind, consensus-driven data-sharing
model that is built on the Hyperledger Fabric. Developing a
sample contract, Sinha and Kaul (2018) propose a KYCsystem based on Ethereum, where blockchain is used as a
general database on which customer data are encrypted
using public–private key cryptography, thus proposing an
encryption scheme similar to Bitcoin. Eventually, Kumar
and Anand (2020) exemplify the implementation of the
blockchain-based KYC-system proposed by Parra Moyano
and Ross (2017) while identifying new issues, including a
missing token-based incentive for participating members
that should help to avoid free-riders.
Comparing the articles identified during the literature
review, Parra Moyano and Ross (2017) yet offer the most
sophisticated prototype in terms of the technical details
presented. We therefore reconstructed and visualized every
step of the KYC-process proposed by Parra Moyano and
Ross (2017), and discussed its transferability and applicability to an ICO investment flow. While the refined KYCprocess was deemed to be suitable to be integrated into an
ICO investment flow from a technical viewpoint, it became
evident that regulatory issues arise from not yet considering the above-described developments of KYC- and AMLregulations, which might have severe consequences not
only for the implementation but also the real-world applicability of a KYC-system. To put this into numbers, a
KYC-system that is not compliant with, e.g., European
AML-regulations, leads to severe fines that typically
amount up to double-digit millions of euros in France and
Germany, and single digit millions everywhere else
(Kirschenbaum 2018).
Consequently, even if regulatory aspects are typically
not in the focus of IS researchers concerned with the design
of blockchain-based KYC-systems, we need to consider
regulations as they might affect the architecture and the
system design of our artifacts. Thus, to ensure the applicability of the envisaged prototype, this paper takes the
KYC-system of Parra Moyano and Ross (2017) as an
impetus and commences – after describing our method –
with the analysis of the laws relevant for the design of
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KYC-processes, in order to build a compliant-by-design
blockchain-based KYC/ICO-system.

3 Research Method
This paper follows the DSR methodology proposed by
Peffers et al. (2008), suggesting a six-staged process
towards the development of an IT artifact (Fig. 1). Notably,
we start with an objective-centered approach toward the
development of a blockchain-based KYC/ICO-system,
which is triggered by regulatory requirements for the
conduct of ICOs and, consequently, leads to the development of design objectives.
The development of design objectives is informed by
what Gregor and Hevner (2013) stated as descriptive (X)
and prescriptive (k) knowledge. Our X-knowledge base
covers ‘‘what we know already’’ (Gregor and Hevner 2013)
and comprises human phenomena, i.e., money laundering
as stated by several reports published by the FATF and the
BaFin (FATF 2014,2018; BaFin 2017) and the increasing
costs of KYC-processes or, more generally, regulatory
compliance for financial organizations (Thomson Reuters
2017a, b). The k-knowledge comprises – among others –
instantiations, i.e., existing systems and processes, which,
in this paper, are constituted in the prototype offered by
Parra Moyano and Ross (2017).
Using the X-and k-knowledge bases as a starting point,
we identified applicable regulations, starting with recommendations issued by the European Securities and Markets
Authority (ESMA), which was the first supervisory
authority to give an overview of applicable laws associated
with the regulation of ICOs (ESMA 2017a). In particular,
the ESMA referred to various legal frameworks which
could become relevant in the context of ICOs, including
organizational and transparency requirements stemming
from the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive
(MiFID), capital and operational rules from the Alternative
Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD), as well as
requirements resulting from the Anti-Money Laundering
Directive (AMLD) (ESMA 2017a, b). Simultaneously, we
screened an advisory letter of the BaFin providing initial
guidance on applicable German laws, referring to the
German Investment Code, the German insurance supervision act, as well as the German Payment Services Supervision Act (BaFin 2017). Moreover, the BaFin emphasized
that issuers of payment and security tokens are explicitly
named as applicable to the German Money Laundering Act
(GwG), meaning that they are required to perform due
diligence methods for their investors (BaFin 2017).
Using these initial pointers from the ESMA and BaFin,
we followed a structured literature review approach
(Webster and Watson 2002), i.e., we started a forward
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Fig. 1 Design science research process and knowledge bases

search, as backward search was not feasible due to the
timeliness of the emerging regulatory assessment of ICOs.
To this end, both authors independently screened the regulations and assessed them in terms of their relevance and
urgency for the KYC/ICO-system design, determined by
the expected penalty for companies in case of non-compliance. The identified regulations were discussed between
the authors until a preliminary set of regulations was
reached. Thereby, the AMLD5 and GwG were identified
and classified as particularly important for the development
of the KYC/ICO-system.
We analyzed each article of the identified regulations
and translated them into design objectives, these being
discussed and adapted by the authors in four discussion
rounds, which amounted to 2 months for the identification
and translations of regulations into initial design objectives.
Thereby, we first agreed on the formulation of system
design objectives for each article and then began to merge
objectives whenever possible. Afterwards, the high-level
architecture for the prototype was designed by the second
author, and both authors discussed the results during two
discussion rounds within one month, including discussions
on issues such as the verification method for identity data
as well as identity data storage locations. Eventually, the
process steps were developed and depicted using a
sequence diagram, and the interface was designed for
demonstration purposes, which lasted three months. Following the approach of Chatterjee et al. (2005), we presented implementation details as well as the interface
design to demonstrate and subsequently to evaluate the
blockchain-based KYC/ICO-system. Thereby, a TechStartup supported the prototype development phase by
providing us with an eID-system, which we integrated into
our developed KYC/ICO-system, as well as by being
available for questions concerning the concrete
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implementation of processes steps, the creation of the
sequence diagram, and the user interface.
Having developed the initial version of our prototype,
two rounds of evaluations were conducted, which each
lasted for two months and included the consultation of
lawyers, IT-experts, and potential users of KYC/ICO-system. Finally, we will communicate our results not only in
this article but strive toward the dissemination of our
results among both IS researchers and practitioners. To this
end, we will disseminate our work additionally through
presentations at practice-oriented conferences, especially
those with a focus on financial services or a regulatory
focus.

4 Requirements Analysis and KYC/ICO-System Design
This section starts by discussing legal requirements and
corresponding design objectives. Note that these already
include the final set of identified regulations, including
adjustments from the ex-ante evaluations. For instance, the
EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) was
deemed relevant during the first evaluation phase due to
enhanced due diligence requirements by the AMLD5,
leading to additional design objectives. While we will
explain the evaluation process in Sect. 6, we consider it
relevant at this point to mention all regulations that have
been incorporated into the design of the prototype. Despite
legal regulations, it became evident that design objectives
will have consequences for further design decisions, even if
these do not originate directly from the KYC- or other legal
requirements. When these consequential requirements
emerge from the analysis of regulations and subsequent
design of the process, we call them progressive requirements and present them after elaborating KYC- and other
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legal requirements. Progressive requirements, thereby,
refer to design decisions made to preserve the applicability
and functionality of the ICO investment flow from the
perspective of an emitter or investor while legal requirements are automatically enforced.
4.1 Legal Requirements and Design Objectives
Designing a compliance-by-design approach necessitates
gathering profound knowledge on regulations with which
processes need to comply (Lohmann 2013). We, therefore,
analyzed the AMLD5, which comes into force in 2020 and
requires companies that want to raise funds via ICOs to
take action in order to comply with EU-regulations as well
as federal regulations, to which the EU-Directive refers.
This paper assumes that an ICO is conducted in Germany,
making it not only subject to EU-regulations but also
federal laws, among others the GwG, which is the German
equivalent to AMLD5. In the following, we discuss legal
KYC-requirements that are summarized and transferred
into design objectives, as shown in Table 1. In total, we
identified six legal requirements relevant for a KYC/ICOsystem that are briefly described in the following.
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Article 8 of the AMLD5 specifies that proper due diligence measures need to be applied when a business relationship between an ICO emitter and an ICO investor is
established, i.e., if money and tokens are exchanged.
AMLD5 thereby refers to federal law and regulations in the
internal market (European Union 2018). In line with the
GwG, identity verification of an ICO investor needs to be
conducted using electronic identification and trust service
for electronic transactions compliant with the so-called
eIDAS regulation. EIDAS deals with the EU-wide acceptance of national identity verification schemes. We refer to
the German eID-scheme as an example, which is notified as
eIDAS compliant since the 22nd August 2017 (BSI 2017).
Furthermore, the GwG requires that data on business
relationships and transactions must be kept for five years,
especially transaction receipts, if they are necessary for the
analysis of transactions. § 10 GwG explains the general due
diligence requirements for this case (BMJV 2019), for
which it is also essential to identify the contracting party
(BMJV 2019). One possibility to verify an identity is the
identification using an electronic verification scheme as
described by § 18 of the Personal Identification Act [§12(1)
GwG], which refers to the aforementioned German eID
scheme. The collected identity should thereby comprise the

Table 1 KYC-, legal requirements and design objectives
No

Source

Requirement

Design objective

Subject: identification and verifying information
(1)

§ 11(a) EUAMLD5 Article
8, § 2 GwG

The customer should be identified, and the customer’s
identity should be verified based on documents, data, or
information obtained from a reliable and independent
source

Within the KYC-system, the initial recording of identity
data must base on information that originates from a
person’s identity card that is demonstrably verified by
German authorities (e.g., through German eID)*

(2)

§ 1 GwG (3), §
11 GwG

Collected identity data should comprise the first name and
surname, place of birth, date of birth, nationality, and a
physical address

To ensure that all necessary identity data are collected, the
KYC-system must be linked to an eIDAS compliant
identity verification scheme to provide a rigorous data
collection and verification process

(3)

§ 15 GwG (4)
sentence 2

For high-value transactions, the source of funds needs to
be identified

An investor who transfers more than a pre-defined limit
needs to fill in an additional data field during the KYCprocess stating information on the source of funds

Subject: data handling
(4)

§ 6 GwG (2), § 8 Data on business relationships and transactions, especially
GwG
transaction receipts, should be kept for the analysis of
transactions for five years

Data on business relationships and transactions must be
stored at least five years on the local database of one of the
contracting parties or on the blockchain, which allows for
shared access

(5)

Sect. 3, Article
16 GDPR

It should be possible to correct inaccurate data

An ICO investor must have the opportunity to ask for the
correction of inaccurate data. To this end, data captured
during the blockchain-based KYC-process need to be
stored in a way that allows for revocation

(6)

Sect. 3, Article
17 GDPR

It should be possible to erase personal data

An ICO investor must have the opportunity to ask the
KYC-provider and emitter to delete any records of
investment progress once the five-year storage obligation
(see requirement 5) is over. Data that is stored locally in
the KYC-provider’s and emitters database must be deleted

*German eID was notified as compliant with EU eIDAS regulation on the 22th August 2017 (BSI 2017)
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first name and surname, place of birth, nationality, and
physical address in the case of natural persons (BMJV
2019).
Moreover, the German legislation distinguishes between
transactions of low risk and high risk for money laundering. In moderate risk cases, simplified due diligence measures can be applied, meaning that it is then sufficient that
the proof of identity of an investor is based on documents
from credible sources. In contrast, enhanced due diligence
measures are demanded if a transaction is especially significant, if the contracting party is a politically exposed
person, or if the party is based in a country associated with
a high risk for money laundering, according to §15(3)
GwG. To assess whether these requirements apply, proper
KYC-measures need to be taken before the business relationship is established. One example of an enhanced due
diligence measure is to identify the source of funds [§15(4)
GwG] (BMJV 2019).
EU regulations concerning data privacy need to be
obeyed as well, especially if personal data should be stored
temporarily. Notably, since the 25th May 2018, the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is in
force, which regulates the processing of personal data
relating to individuals in the EU by an individual, a company, or an organization (European Union 2016; European
Commission 2018). According to GDPR, processing entities need to inform the subject which data is collected and
how it is used. Furthermore, individuals have the right to
ask for information about all personal data saved by an
entity (Sect. 2, Article 13, GDPR).
While compliance with these regulations can be met by
choosing a blockchain-based approach, there are other data
subject rights that are more difficult to integrate in a
blockchain-based solution. For instance, GDPR specifies
that data subjects have the right to ask for incorrect,
inaccurate or incomplete personal data to be corrected as
well as the right to demand data-processing entities to erase
personal data when it is no longer needed or if the processing is unlawful (Sect. 3, Article 16, GDPR). However,
the design principles of a blockchain try to establish
immutability of data, meaning that the deletion or correction of data on the blockchain is typically not supported.
Thus it is necessary to combine blockchain with off-chain
solutions to cope with the requirement of revocation and
erasure of personal data as stated by the GDPR (European
Commission 2019).
4.2 Progressive Requirements and Design Objectives
The ESMA and the BaFin have both issued alerts to
investors, making them aware of the risks associated with
investments into ICOs (ESMA 2017a, b). In particular,
they state that it is risky for an investor to transfer money to
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an unknown blockchain address since it is uncertain whether tokens will be received. To encounter this risk, most
ICOs are based on smart contracts which eventually ensure
that investors receive tokens in exchange for the money
transferred. As legal requirements necessitate that KYCprocesses are conducted before tokens are exchanged for
money during an ICO, typically tokens are not sent to the
investor right away. From the perspective of the investor,
thus, a maximum of transparency is required to reduce the
perceived risks associated with investing in an ICO. To do
so, the investor needs to have insights into the current state
of the token sale before tokens are provided (e.g., through
automatically triggered status updates).
Given the fact that KYC-results are stored on a blockchain, if the identity verification is successful, the KYCprocess is expected to be more efficient in terms of money
[i.e., due to KYC-verification process cost-sharing among
financial organizations (Parra Moyano and Ross 2017)] as
well as faster. In particular, if the KYC-process is integrated into the ICO investment flow by storing the KYC
results on the blockchain, we expect a faster cycle time
compared to a solution where a KYC-process is triggered
only after the investment. This is because by integrating the
KYC-process, we explicitly declare its completion as a
requirement for a token swap. Furthermore, we require that
the investor should be able to always complete the KYCprocess itself in less than 10 min, because longer waiting
times typically lead to displeased users (Elst et al. 2017).
Hence, additional to investors’ requirement that status
updates on the KYC-process need to be available, the
KYC-processes should be conducted in a way that speeds
up and automates both the KYC- as well as the ICO-process. Notably, this objective is shared by several products
on the market, e.g., IdentityMindGlobal (2019) or SumSub
(2019).
Eventually, access to KYC-results and investments
stored on the blockchain needs to be managed, meaning
that investors typically require that their investments are
not trackable, i.e., linkable to their identity by third parties
(European Commission 2019). Preventing transaction flow
analysis, however, can be realized by technical measures
(e.g., using an address shuffling based anonymization
approach) or non-technical means (e.g., providing guidelines how to make the transaction flow analysis harder)
(Khalilov et al. 2018). Linked to the need to manage data is
key management, which helps to prevent privacy gaps, but
at the same time is aimed at being user-friendly (Thwin and
Vasupongayya 2019). Thus, while Parra Moyano and Ross
(2017) do not discuss key management, our prototype
should facilitate as-easy-as-possible verification as several
studies showed that manual, user-centric access control and
an immutable access log, as well as attribute-based
encryption schemes, might create barriers to use
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blockchain-based systems (Thwin and Vasupongayya
2019). Thus, we propose a KYC-system in which users can
manage their key over a web interface that allows for
privacy-friendly, fast and easy to use communication with
parties that are part of the KYC/ICO-process.
Table 2 summarizes the above-explained requirements
relevant to the design of our KYC/ICO-system. Together
with the legal requirements, summarized in Table 1, these
requirements and objectives provide the input for the
design of our prototype.

5 Prototype Design and Demonstration
The following section provides an overview of the highlevel architecture of the prototype and how involved parties
interact with each other.
5.1 High-Level Architecture Features
The ICO investment process is orchestrated by a smart
contract running on a blockchain platform. This component
handles the financial exchange of the investors’ money and
emitter tokens, acting as an escrow holder. While the smart
contract is already a common component for running ICOs,
we propose to integrate the KYC-process with the financial
flow by deploying the smart contract on the same blockchain on which the ICO is performed. In particular, the
smart contract serves as an intermediary that holds on to
the funds until the emitter has finally decided whether the
investment is accepted or not. In return, the investor has the
guarantee that funds are secured: Either the investor
receives tokens or at least gets all invested funds back.
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By requiring the KYC-provider to record the status of
successful completion of the KYC-process on the smart
contract, we achieve a legally compliant solution and offer
enhanced transparency to the investor. In particular, the
ICO investor uses a web interface to interact with the smart
contract. This web interface is used to provide the ICO
investor with information regarding the status of the KYCcompletion. This increases transparency for the investor as
the successful completion of the KYC-process is communicated as a prerequisite for exchanging funds and tokens.
To be compliant with GDPR, the actual identity data of
the investor are stored off-chain. This is because an onchain solution would allow other parties to reuse or copy
the identity-related information for potential misuse. Furthermore, these data could not be deleted once stored on
the blockchain, which would against provoke a conflict
with the GDPR. Thus, data is mutually shared off-chain
between the KYC-provider and the ICO emitter. This step
necessitates that the ICO emitter trusts the KYC-provider
that it verifies the identity of the investor in compliance
with the applicable laws. To allow a later correction of the
data, we refrained from storing a hash value on the
blockchain. While we acknowledge that there exist proposals that allow for a later modification (e.g., Ateniese
et al. 2017), public blockchains that are used for ICOs
currently lack this possibility.
For this prototype, we assume that the KYC-process is
linked to the German eID scheme. Notably, the GwG
principally distinguishes between cases where the identity
has to be captured in detail (i.e., high-value transactions)
and cases where regulations are less strict. For ICOs,
however, currently no clear guideline exists for which
transaction value eased verification processes are sufficient.
Thus, as safeguarding principle, KYC-providers should

Table 2 Progressive requirements and design objectives
No

Source

Requirement

Design objective

Subject: investors privacy and ICO-process transparency
(7)

Investor

It should not be possible for other people to track the
investor in the future

The KYC-system must prevent transaction flow analysis
through proper technical and non-technical solutions

(8)

Investor

The investor needs to know in which phase the token
sale process currently is and when tokens will be
provided

The KYC-system must provide status updates of the KYCprocess available for the investor

Subject: process design
(9)

Investor/ICO
emitter

The ICO investor should not manually conduct public/
private key management

The KYC-system should allow key management facilitated
via a web interface; proper incentives for investors need to be
set

(10)

Investor/ICO
emitter/existing
products

The KYC-process should be integrated into the
investment process and should not take longer than ten
minutes to complete

The KYC-process should run on a decentralized, public
blockchain solution, which allows parties involved in the ICO
to access the results of the KYC-process as fast as possible
through the elimination of third parties
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strive for a solution that satisfies the highest legal regulations and methods listed in § 15 GwG, of which eID is one
possible solution. To communicate with the eID backend
server, the investor uses an eID Provider app, which is used
to verify the identity without any human interaction. In
particular, every identity card that is issued to German
citizens and foreigners that live permanently in Germany
has an integrated chip that, together with Near Field
Communication (NFC) capabilities available for most of
today’s smartphones, is capable of verifying identities
electronically. Hence, if investors own such a phone, they
can use their identity card to verify their identity electronically. As the eID system has proven compliant with
eIDAS regulation, it can be used for every EU-based ICO.

2.

3.

4.

5.2 Sequence of Process Steps
Figure 2 depicts the high-level architecture of the prototype, indicating the sequence of process steps. We explain
the process steps of the combined ICO/KYC-process in the
following. For a detailed description of the architecture and
process steps, we refer to ‘‘Appendix’’ A (available online
via https://springerlink.com), showing a sequence diagram
of the KYC/ICO-process according to the UML-standard.
1.

The investor starts the ICO-investment and KYCprocess by sending a specific amount of money to the
smart contract which records the investment. Tokens
that the investor is expected to receive in exchange for
his money are not transferred to the investor right
away. First, the customer’s identity needs to be
checked, and the ICO emitter needs to accept the
investor (i.e., an ICO emitter can refuse to send tokens
in exchange for money received if, for instance, a

Fig. 2 High-level architecture of the prototype
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5.

6.

7.

8.

country prohibits ICOs). For this purpose, the smart
contract prevents the direct transfer of funds against
tokens until the verification process is completed.
After the initial transfer of money, the investor needs
to verify his or her identity by starting a new identity
verifying session by using the ICO Investment Web
Interface. This web interface provides information
about the status of the investment and the KYCprocess to the investor.
The investor uses the eID-providers’ app, his or her
identity card or residence permit, and the secret PIN to
prove his or her identity.
Once the identity data is proofed via the eID-providers
App, it is shared with the KYC-provider that is in
charge of verifying the correctness of personal information. The KYC-provider stores the identity data offchain.
After the data is recorded with the KYC-provider, the
status, i.e., the completion of the KYC-process, is
recorded on the blockchain.
The investor uses the ICO investment web interface to
ensure that the KYC-process was appropriately
recorded.
Afterward, detailed identity data needs to be shared
with the ICO emitter because the emitter needs to
decide whether the investment is to be accepted or not.
Depending on the emitter’s decision whether to accept
the investor, two variants are possible for the last step:
If the emitter accepts the investor (8a), the ICO emitter
provides the tokens and receives the investment in
return. If the investor is denied by the emitt(8b)er, the
investor is refunded the invested money. In this case,
no token exchange takes place.
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5.3 Implementation and Demonstration
We implemented the prototype on a decentralized blockchain platform. We compared available public blockchain
platforms based on the CCID’s Global Public Blockchain
Technology Assessment Index published by the Ministry of
Industry and Information in China (Das 2019), whose
index scores distributed ledger projects in the subcategories
basic technology, applicability, and creativity. We required
the overall rating of the blockchain to be in the top ten list.
Additionally, for integrating the KYC-process into the
token/money swap, we expected parties relevant to the
KYC/ICO-process to be able to record the state of the
investment and the KYC-process, which excludes payment-only blockchains like Bitcoin. We found that both
Ethereum and EOS fulfill these criteria.
We developed a cost prediction for these platforms for
the prototype presented in Table 3. The table shows which
and how many resources are consumed per process step. As
both blockchains use different cost models, the corresponding units for the different consumed resources are
given as well, with costs per unit based on average prices in
the time frame 01.07.2018–30.11.2018.
Based on these considerations, EOS turned out to be less
expensive, i.e., identity verification costs U.S.$ 0.09per
investor. Furthermore, while Ethereum requires the investor to cover all costs of the investment process, EOS allows
sharing the costs incurred by the used platform resources.
Therefore, we decided to build our KYC/ICO-system on
the EOS platform. However, there are no technical reasons
why a similar system could not be developed on the
Ethereum platform as well.
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Figure 3 shows the main user interface of the prototype.
The user interface is split into three areas for the different
user groups and technical components, i.e., investors,
emitter, KYC-provider, and the smart contract. Notably, in
a real scenario, a user only gets to see one interface, as a
user typically has only one role.
An investment is started as soon as the investor starts the
KYC/ICO-process by entering the EOS username into an
input field, which is ‘‘investor1’’ in Fig. 3. A click on
‘‘update’’ will show the investor’s current balance. If there
is currently no investment, an input field appears where the
number of EOS coins can be chosen. As soon as the
investor clicks on ‘‘invest EOS,’’ the coins are transferred
to the account of the smart contract. A click on ‘‘update’’ in
the box of the smart contract will show that the balance of
the contract has increased by the amount that has been
invested. After the coins are transferred, the UI asks the
investor to start the KYC-process, as shown in the investor’s box in Fig. 3. If the investor clicks on the link, the
web page is opened, providing a QR code that needs to be
scanned using the eID-Providers App (Fig. 4, left picture).
For our prototype, we used an existing eID system provided by a Tech-Startup, which also supplies the app. If the
invested amount of funds exceeds a predefined threshold,
the app requires the investor to enter information on the
funds’ source (e.g., by writing a statement or by attaching
documents that prove the source of funds). After the
investor has entered the PIN of his identity card, the card is
connected to the phone so that communication via NFC can
take place.
Once the KYC-process is finished, the app shows a TAN
which needs to be entered on the website. The EOS

Table 3 Cost estimation for the prototype for Ethereum and EOS
Step

Costs for Ethereum

Costs for EOS

Investor sends funds to smart contract

21,000 gas for transaction ? 20,000 gas for storage

0.3 KiB RAM
0.132 KiB/Day Network

Investor finishes KYC and claims KYC-token

21,000 gas for transaction ? 5,000 gas for storage update

1.035 ms/Day CPU
0.117 KiB/Day Network

KYC-provider sets KYC ‘‘Done’’ flag

21,000 gas for transaction ? 5,000 gas for storage update

0.103 KiB/Day Network

Emitter sends token, receives back money

3 * 21,000 gas for transactions

0.471 ms/Day CPU
0.600 ms/Day CPU
0.134 KiB/Day
3.070 ms/Day CPU
Refund after investment done

- 15,000 gas for deleting data entry

- 0.2 KiB RAM
- 0.486 KiB/Day Network
- 5.176 ms/Day CPU

Total of required resources

141,000 gas

0.1 KiB RAM

Costs per unit

19.169 Gwei per gas, 1 Gwei = 0.000 000 2766 $

0.88 $ per KiB

Total costs per accepted investor

0.75 $

0.09 $
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Fig. 3 Screenshot of the main user interface (identity data are shown once the mouse hovers over the icon in the ‘‘identity’’ column)
Fig. 4 Start and end of the
KYC-process for the ICO
investor

username will be captured as well so that the KYC-provider already knows which user will claim the captured
identity. However, since the investor has not yet used his or
her blockchain private key to sign a transaction, the KYCprovider cannot be sure yet that the entered username
belongs to the captured identity. After the investor has
inserted the TAN from the app and the EOS username, a
click on ‘‘send’’ will lead to the screen shown in Fig. 4
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(right picture). There the investor can see all of the data
that have been read out from the card. These data are
already stored in the off-chain database of the KYC-provider but are not yet connected to an EOS username. A
connection is established by registering the ‘‘KYC-Token,’’
which is generated randomly by the KYC-provider and
references a single identity data set. The investor now
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sends a blockchain message to the smart contract with this
token inside.
The advantage of sending this message on the blockchain is that it has the investor’s signature, which ensures
the authenticity of the message. It is possible to send this
message with a click on the button ‘‘Register Token on
Blockchain.’’ After the click, the investor is informed that
the KYC-process window can be closed. In the main UI of
the prototype, a click on ‘‘Update’’ in the investor box will
now report that the KYC-process has successfully been
carried out. As long as the emitter has not provided the
tokens, the investor can unwind the investment at any time.
This will trigger a transfer of the initially invested EOS
amount from the smart contract back to the investor.
The emitter sees a table with all investments that have
been made into the ICO in the main UI, as shown in Fig. 3.
In the example, ‘‘investor1’’ has not yet completed the
KYC-process. In contrast, ‘‘investor2’’ and ‘‘investor3’’
have already completed the KYC-process, which means
that their investment is ready for acceptance. The emitter
can hover over the blue icon to see the identity data of an
investor. If the investor is accepted, a click on the checkmark triggers a swap. The ICO tokens (‘‘ICOT’’ in the
example) are then transferred to the smart contract by the
emitter, that forwards the tokens to the investor. At the
same time, the smart contract sends the EOS coins to the
emitter. Eventually, all data regarding the investment (investor, invested amount) is deleted from the list of ongoing
investments in the smart contract.

6 Evaluation
In this section we evaluate the developed prototype of a
blockchain-based KYC/ICO-system. Notably, we conduct
requirements as well as applicability checks to assess both
the rigor and relevance of the developed KYC/ICO-system
(Rosemann and Vessey 2008). We summarize this process
in Table 4.
6.1 Legal and System Design Evaluation
To assess the rigor of the developed prototype, we conducted two types of assessments, on the one hand one
regarding legal requirements and, on the other, a system
design check. Whereas the first serves as a tool to ensure
that all relevant legal requirements are considered, meaning that the developed KYC/ICO-system uses the right
regulations as input, the latter ensures that the system is
technically feasible and compliant-by-design. The consultations with lawyers were not audio-recorded due to legal
reasons, therefore the reported feedback described in the
following is based on conversation notes.
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The first round of the legal requirements check was
conducted during two 1-h consultations each with a lawyer
experienced in the conduct of ICOs, including necessary
KYC-processes which were identified through an Internet
search. After having outlined the objectives of our prototype, we explained the process with which we had identified regulations and the resulting set of legal requirements
and objectives. We asked the lawyer for an assessment
concerning whether or not the identified regulations were
appropriate and complete given the legal situation. During
the consultation, it was pointed out that given the preliminary information provided by the BaFin, a final statement
on the completeness of regulations can only be made for
the time being. Additionally, it became evident that
potential violations of the GDPR may arise due to the
implementation of AML-regulations, especially the
increased due diligence requirements. This insight triggered the renewed start of the requirement search focusing
on GDPR and related regulations. Using forward search,
relevant requirements related to the privacy of ICO participants were identified and subsequently translated into
design objectives, leading us to the final set of ten objectives presented previously (Table 1). The second consultation with the lawyer in the first evaluation round led to
minor linguistic adaptations as well as to the approval of
the completeness of privacy-related legal requirements.
We conducted a second round of evaluation focusing on
the legal requirements by approaching two additional
lawyers as recommended by the first lawyer. We conducted
separate interviews which lasted 1 h and 0,5 h respectively,
again explaining the KYC/ICO-system and asking for their
assessment concerning the completeness and appropriateness of the identified regulations. While both lawyers
agreed on the completeness and appropriateness of the
identified regulations and design objectives, one lawyer
stressed the provisional nature of these findings. In particular, the lawyer stressed that it is essential to have the
possibility of adapting rules, and thus smart contracts, fast
and conveniently as the legal situation can change quickly.
Moreover, it was discussed that, at the moment, the prototype is only compliant-by-design for the European and
mainly the German legal area.
Including these objections in the technical evaluation,
we performed two rounds of system design evaluation by
IT-experts, the description of which can be found in
Table 5. These experts were not previously involved in the
construction of the artifact (Frank 2007) and had considerable experience in designing identity solutions in the
context of KYC-systems. The experts were identified using
snowball sampling, i.e., we used recommendations from
each of the identified experts, with the supporting Techstartup recommending the first expert. While we are aware
that this method could lead to biases in some cases, it was

123

562

N. K. Ostern, J. Riedel: Know-Your-Customer (KYC) Requirements for Initial Coin Offerings, Bus Inf Syst Eng 63(5):551–567 (2021)

Table 4 Evaluation process and criteria
Evaluation
purpose

Evaluation step

Rigor

Legal requirements and
system design check

Evaluation criteria

Iterations and participants

Relevance and completeness
of legal requirements

Round 1

Round 2

Interview with 1 lawyer (2
consultations)

Interviews with 2 lawyers (1
consultation each)

Interviews with 3 IT professionals
(for details, see Table 5)

Interviews with 2 IT professionals
(for details, see Table 5)

Appropriateness of design
objectives
Fulfillment of requirements
(1)–(10)
Technical feasibility of
automatic rule enforcement
Relevance

Applicability checks

Interviews with 16 potential users (1 interview each)

Importance
Accessibility
Suitability

Table 5 Descriptive characteristics of IT-experts
Round
1

2

Professional background

Organizational position

Years of experience (in the field of work)

Frequency of consultation

Engineer

C-level manager

13

1

Computer Scientist

C-level manager

4

2

Computer scientist

Software Lead developer

12

4

Engineer

Software engineer

6

1

Computer scientist

Software developer

3

1

deemed appropriate given the few IT-experts who possess a
comprehensive understanding of both the conduct of ICOs
and KYC-processes.
We explained the KYC/ICO-system objectives as well
as graphical representations (i.e., the high-level architecture, sequence diagram, and the interface) to the experts,
asking for their assessment. We conducted semi-structured
interviews that were audio-recorded, transcribed, and
coded subsequently (Wolfswinkel et al. 2013). Importantly,
we informed the experts that we seek honest expert evaluation which provides us with advice on how to improve
the prototype.
The results of the system design evaluation are summarized in Table 6. According to the results of the evaluation, the prototype is capable of enforcing five out of ten
requirements related to the identification and verification of
information, process design, and KYC/ICO-process transparency. We marked automatically enforceable objectives
in Table 4 using an’’F,’’ indicating that these objectives are
compliant-by-design. Partially fulfilled objectives refer to
objectives and associated rules that can be technically
enforced, which were however not yet sufficiently legally
specified, i.e., the threshold for large funds was not specified up until the current date, or rules required the
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enforcement of regulations beyond the KYC/ICO-systems
boundaries, e.g., the global deletion of personal data on
local servers.
During the interviews, experts claimed that three
objectives could not be enforced, e.g., we were not able to
deploy the fourth legal requirement, stating that data on
business relationships and transactions should be kept for a
subsequent analysis for five years. Moreover, while the
transaction log of blockchain makes a receipt of the tokenmoney swap accessible, there is no mechanism implemented that stores the captured identity of approved or
denied investors in order to avoid investor tracking and,
especially, transaction flow analysis. Thus, a full transaction record, including not only information on the amount
of money and tokens transferred but also identity-related
information, is not intended due to privacy protection
regulations (European Commission 2019). This issue
becomes even more relevant when looking at proposed
solutions to avoid transaction tracking and to protect
investors’ privacy. Khalilov et al. (2018) analyze tools that
strive toward improving ICO investors’ privacy based on,
for instance, decryption mix-nets, fair exchange protocols,
or zero-knowledge proofs, but the majority of these solutions are still in their conceptual development phase.
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Also, blockchain technology typically supports only
pseudo-anonymous transactions, which means that identities of the transacting parties are not known to the public.
Consequently, recording investors’ identities along with
the funds is a task left to the ICO emitter, who is expected
to implement a document management system with which
he or she may support transaction analysis. The main issue
here, however, is that of interoperability. Future research
should thus focus on how we can create interfaces to
combine blockchain and other centralized or decentralized
infrastructures to maximize efficiency and cost-saving
potentials of blockchain-based KYC solutions.
Lastly, our prototype ensures that the outcome of a
KYC-process and information related to an individual
cannot be revoked by any party other than the KYC-provider. While we stated this requirement before the development of our prototype, the implementation of these
features requires a careful evaluation of possible permission structures and the development of a governance
framework. While this was out of scope for this research
project, IT-experts emphasized that future research needs
to develop governance structures that support KYC and
ICO-processes on a public blockchain while distributing
permission rights in such a way that, as far as possible, no
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single party involved in the joint KYC/ICO-process can
change data unnoticed. At the same time, the current legal
situation requires that state authorities verify identities.
Thus, while complete decentralization might be technically
feasible (Parra Moyano and Ross 2017), the legal situation
requires partial centralization, i.e., a trusted authority
responsible for verifying identities and for deciding upon
the success of the KYC-process. Given the current European and, in particular, German jurisprudence, the blockchain-based KYC-system proposed in this paper,
consequently, allows as much decentralization as technically and legally possible.
In our second round of the technical evaluation, we
received the feedback to analyze the coding of the smart
contract from a security perspective, as cases of lost funds
have resulted from smart contract design issues in the past.
Thus, we performed a security assessment by checking for
common pitfalls in smart contract coding (Atzei et al.
2017). One of the flaws identified relates to the fact that
KYC-providers map the captured identity data and the
corresponding blockchain username only by trusting the
saved KYC-token found in the smart contract. A malicious
miner could steal the KYC-token that a user was about to
enter and could himself claim this token by adding the

Table 6 Requirements and design objectives evaluation (Status (Stat.): F – fulfilled, PF – partial fulfilled, NF – not fulfilled)
No

Stat

Remarks/limitations

Subject: Identification and verifying information
1.

F

We addressed this need by linking our prototype to the German identity card and the respective backend server, i.e., base our
approach on data that is verified by authorities. This approach also ensures the accuracy of the data

2.

F

There are rare cases in which authorities do not have all the information. In this case, Objective 2 cannot be fulfilled

3.

PF

If funds exceed a certain threshold, the eID Provider’s App requires the investor to make a statement on the source of funds or add
corresponding documents. There is no legal rule what is deemed sufficient for this. Thus the emitter needs to decide whether the
information is adequate or not

Subject: data handling
4.

NF

While the transaction as such is stored on-chain, information on the emitter or investor is not. Enriching the KYC-process with
additional information is an implementation task for the emitter, who is expected to have an off-chain document management system

5.

NF

Currently, the prototype does not provide data processing. From a technical viewpoint, however, the implementation of permissions
to modify personal data can be easily implemented

6.

PF

An investor can ask the KYC-provider and ICO emitter to delete personal data after the five-year storage obligation has expired.
Automated enforcement mechanisms cannot be implemented. Transaction-related information cannot be deleted without significant
expenditure

Subject: investors privacy and KYC/ICO-process transparency
7.

NF

No technical solution is available yet that prevents the privacy violations – possible solutions are currently in the development phase,
but not applicable to web services, see, for example, Khalilov et al. (2018). GDPR prevents the KYC-provider and ICO emitter from
tracking future investments. The investor can implement precautions, e.g., use token mixers or different storing wallets

8.

F

Investors can quickly inform themselves about the status of the KYC and investment process using the app. The completion of the
KYC-process is a prerequisite for the token-money swap between an investor and an emitter

Subject: process design
9.

F

Public/private key management is handled via the ICO investment web interface, providing a one-click solution

10.

F

The process of downloading the eID provider’s app, scanning the QR-Code on the website of the KYC-provider, entering the PIN,
attaching the identity card, and finally entering the TAN is estimated by experts to be completed in less than 10 min
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KYC-token to the information of his investment. Then the
KYC-provider would erroneously assign the captured offchain identity data to the blockchain account of the miner
instead of to the one of a legitimate investor.
We addressed this issue by adding off-chain information
from the investor to the KYC-provider containing the
investor username. This way, the KYC-provider can check
whether the KYC-token found in the smart contract onchain belongs to the same investor name transmitted offchain. The on-chain information is taken into account
because of the proven message authenticity by the investor.
Another improvement for the coding was an added warning
if a smart contract is fraudulently used to emulate an
investor, which possibly leads to attacks because of limited
computing resources. Furthermore, we ensured that status
checks and status updates in the coding are always performed before funds or tokens are transferred to prevent
reentrancy or unpredictable state attacks.
6.2 Applicability of KYC/ICO System
We assessed the relevance of the designed KYC/ICOsystem, conducting an applicability test (Rosemann and
Vessey 2008). We conducted 16 semi-structured interviews
with potential users of the KYC/ICO-systems, focusing on
ICO investors who had already experienced a KYC-verification process. Our interview partners were mostly male
(68%) and participated on average in 3 ICOs. Before the
interviews started, we explained the objectives and the
design of the KYC/ICO-system to participants, laying
special emphasis on how they would interact and use the
system once it was implemented. Doing this, we constantly
made sure that the interview partner understood the basic
functionalities and the objectives of the designed KYC/
ICO-system. During the interviews, we asked participants
whether the designed KYC/ICO-system is important, i.e.,
tackles key issues when investing via ICOs, whether it
addresses a real-world problem, and if it is timely (Rosemann and Vessey 2008). Second, we evaluated whether the
designed solution is accessible, i.e., whether the design is
understandable and outcomes, e.g., the user interface, are
perceived as usable. Third, we asked for the assessment of
the prototype’s suitability, i.e., whether the designed KYC/
ICO-system is perceived to be a solution to the problem at
hand. Eventually, it was emphasized that there were no
right or wrong answers and that the goal of the interview
was to assess the relevance of the prototype from the users’
perspective.
The evaluation of the interviews indicated the relevance
of the developed solution from the user’s perspective. 75%
of the interview partners reported slow identity checks
when registering on platforms or websites based on which
users can trade and invest in ICOs, with the main problem
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being that identity checks had to be repeated several times
due to technical problems leading to non-identifiability.
25% even claimed to have aborted the process, as the reverification of the identity verification was either too timeconsuming or – with 16% of the interview partners – led to
distrust. 38% of the interview partners stated that they had
problems connecting their trading activities with their bank
account, as the bank terminated such a connection for
security reasons. Overall, the majority of respondents
(94%) indicated that they would use a KYC/ICO-system
offered by financial organizations to verify their identity if
the system solved the problems mentioned above, i.e.,
ensured speed and reliability of identity verification.
Potential users were less clear in terms of their assessment of the accessibility of the designed ICO/KYC-process. While 56% of the participants stated that they
generally appreciated a solution based on QR codes given
the ease of use with which the identity can be proofed, 13%
were worried about the security of the system. While
security checks must be in place, especially at interfaces (
and have to be further developed and checked when the
prototype is implemented), 19% of interview partners,
claimed that a solution in cooperation with eID-providers
which are compliant with eIDAS regulation increase confidence in the security of the ICO/KYC-system in general.
Moreover, 44% of the interview partners stated that while
they generally thought that the demonstrated system
seemed to be intuitive to use, they would have to use the
system on their laptop or mobile phone when investing in
an ICO for a final evaluation.
Lastly, we evaluated the suitability of the designed
KYC/ICO-system by asking whether the designed solution
was perceived to actually solve problems of ICO investors.
Our interview partners were quite clear about this point,
i.e., 94% claimed that the proposed system was suitable to
solve identity verification issues assuming that the system
works as described, i.e., that no major technical problems
occur and that the implementation of identity verification
works rapidly and reliably. In fact, potential users stated
that they perceived the solution as especially suited as it
reduced the complexity for the user, while potentially
reducing the costs for KYC-processes depending on the
amount of participating financial organizations. Thereby,
19% of the interview partners primarily see financial
organizations in the responsibility to take care of proper
KYC-verification processes, meaning that KYC-processes
are demanded to be fast, reliable as well as connectable with ICO processes by integrating innovative
solutions. Thus, the majority of interview partners perceived the proposed KYC/ICO-system as suitable to solve
experienced issues, assuming the faultless functioning of
the prototype once fully implemented.
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7 Limitations
This paper proposes a joint KYC/ICO-system that strives
for compliance-by-design with the recently updated regulatory provisions of the European Union (European Union
2018) concerned with customer due diligence duties and
the prevention of money laundering. To this end, we performed a requirement analysis of EU and German regulations that served as design objectives for the envisaged
KYC/ICO-systems. While we see contributions made by
this paper mainly arising from research at the intersection
of information system design and legal issues, we need to
view our results in the light of its limitations.
First, we did not manage to implement all objectives
stemming either from not yet fully developed regulations
or, most importantly, from other pieces of legislation that
prevent the implementation of objectives. While we
acknowledge that especially the latter limits the automation
of compliance, we argue that these conflicts are in the
realm of lawyers and the government who need to take on a
clearer stance when it comes to conflicting regulations.
Having said this, we admit that the presented KYC/ICOsystem is a snapshot of the current legal situation, meaning
that objectives and, consequently, the system design need
to be adapted to possibly changing KYC/AML and ICOregulations that can evolve over the next years. The same
applies to the currently proposed combination of on- and
off-chain solutions, whereby the current data handling
solution must be subject to a constant review of further
technical developments of blockchains.
Second, the evaluation of the prototype builds on
experts’ assessment of the objectives as well as the system
design. Experts capable of assessing compliance for a
KYC-system in the context of an ICO are scarce, meaning
that the evaluation of the legal objectives and complianceby-design resides on assessments of nine experts. While we
acknowledge that for a typical IT artifact the amount of
experts assessing a system should be larger, we lay special
emphasis on the quality and capability of experts assessing
our KYC/ICO-system, which is why we deem the evaluation to be adequate for the time being. While the same
holds for the applicability checks, we however see the need
to implement the system in a real-world context in order to
conduct further evaluations.
While the designed KYC/ICO-system is a blueprint for a
compliant-by-design KYC-system that might also be
applied to other contexts than ICOs, future work needs to
focus on the implementation of a system used by multiple
financial organizations. During this work, several further
questions can and need to be answered, including whether
and how the KYC/ICO-system can be implemented into
existing infrastructures of financial organizations and what
issues need to be dealt with, especially focusing on
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potential security issues that emerge at interfaces. Second,
while applicability checks have been made with potential
users, further research needs to assess the applicability of
the KYC/ICO-system focusing on financial organizations.
While we are convinced that the assessment of users is
equally important, due to arising network effects, applicability checks with financial organizations might yield further insights. The assessment of financial organizations,
thereby, potentially affects the design of governance rules,
including decision rights, accountability, and incentives
(Beck et al. 2018) that need to be designed and tested
before and post-implementation.
The need to specify governance rules and incentives
leads to the third limitation of this paper, which is that we
currently cannot assess the exact pecuniary benefits of
using a KYC/ICO-system. While it would be possible to
theoretically approximate these costs (Parra Moyano and
Ross 2017), exact calculations require insights into the
actual cost structure of organizations’ KYC-processes.
While this is out of the scope for this paper, we see the
necessity to tackle this issue before implementing the
system in real-world settings. Additionally, a comprehensive evaluation of the added value would require to assess
alternative solutions, which also includes the assessment of
other than blockchain infrastructures. While this might be
especially important if we strive for compliant-by-design
KYC-systems that are not designed for the conduct of
ICOs, we argue that for a joint KYC/ICO-system, the
blockchain probably provides the most efficient solution
due to a minimum of interfaces and media discontinuity.

8 Conclusion
This paper uses design science research to develop a
compliant-by-design blockchain-based KYC-system that is
integrated into the investment flow of an ICO. While we
provide insights into the system design, the main contribution of this paper is the identification and integration of
legal KYC-requirements that are used as input for the
design of the KYC/ICO-system. We design a prototype that
promotes the development of legally secure blockchainbased KYC-systems and provides a starting point for future
research, especially toward the development of governance
and legal frameworks for decentralized KYC-systems
based on blockchain technology. While we are convinced
that the system is transferable to other contexts, we see
further work emerging around the issue of designing governance rules as well as for the further evaluation of the
rigor and applicability of this or future versions of the
prototype, referring to both participating financial organizations as well as ICO investors.
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